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1I.

I. INTRODUCTION
The notion that physicians must obtain the consent of their patients
before performing a medical procedure is a very old rule of law,1 for it

* B.A., B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham; J.D., John Marshall Law
School; LL.M. (Health Law), DePaul University.
1. This rule is generally traced back to the 18th century case of Slater v. Baker, 95
Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767), wherein the court stated that "it is reasonable that a patient
should be told what is about to be done to him, that he may take courage and put himself in
such a situation as to enable him to undergo the operation." Id. at 862. See Steven R.
Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 Hous. L. REv. 209, 218 n.53 (1991)
(stating that "[l]iability for the absence of consent, and the doctrine of consent to
experimental treatment first arose in Slater v. Baker"); Ranelle A. Leier, Note, Torts:
Defining the Duty Imposed on Physicians by the Doctrine of Informed Consent: K.A.C. v.
Benson, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 149, 150 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he requirement of
consent to medical treatment traces back to English Common law in 1767"). Contra Gerald
Robertson, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 97 L. Q. REv. 102, 103 n.6 (1981)
(arguing that "[tihe view expressed by some American commentators that the doctrine of
informed consent can be traced back to the English decision of Slater v. Baker is at best
illusory").
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touches on some of the most basic of all human rights-that is, of
individual autonomy and the patient's right to prevent an unauthorized
touching. 2 Thus, at least in theory, it would seem that the doctrine of
informed consent would be a well-established principle within the doctorpatient relationship. In fact, however, there is a significant difference
between this ideal and the reality of medical disclosure. At its most basic
level, the informed consent doctrine imposes on physicians the duty to
make adequate disclosures to patients concerning proposed medical
treatment, so that patients can make informed health care decisions.
However, the rapid evolution of the doctrine in this country-due in part to
the progression of medical knowledge and physician training, as well as
societal attitudes about health care 3-has made the doctrine a difficult
theory to accurately gauge.4 This task is made even more difficult when
one considers that the doctrine's historical development was the product of
legal theory rather than medical intervention.5 Indeed, the legal system has

2.
See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 n.4 (1982) (stating that "the right to
refuse any medical treatment emerged from the doctrine of trespass and battery, which were
applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician"); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
930 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (stating that "there is perhaps no right which is older than a person's
right to be free from unwarranted contact"); Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 862 (La.
1983) (explaining that "[t]he doctrine of consent to medical treatment is rooted in the idea
that a person has the right to make major decisions regarding his own body").
3.
See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 76 (1994) (noting that "[tihe introduction of scientific
reasoning into medicine, aided by the results of carefully conducted research, permitted
doctors for the first time to discriminate more aptly between knowledge, ignorance and
conjecture in their recommendations for or against treatment").
4.
Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 175
(1994); Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v.
Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 1079, 1087 (1997).
5.
See Katz, supra note 3, at 77; Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent:
From "Doctor is Right" to "Patient Has Rights," 50 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1243, 1244-45
(2000).
While much has been written about the doctrine of informed consent, a core
understanding on the subject would include the following materials: PAUL APPELBAUM ET
AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN
& TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); JAY KATz,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) [hereinafter KATz, SILENT WORLD];

Gary Boland, The Lack of Consent and Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Procedure in
Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REv. 1 (1984); Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in
Medical Decisionmaking:Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
379 (1990); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?: Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv.
137 (1977); Derek Kroft, Informed Consent: A ComparativeAnalysis, 6 J. INT'L L. & PRAC.
457 (1997); William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a "MaterialInformation"
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 711 (1995); Armand
Arabian, Informed Consent: From the Ambivalence of Arato to the Thunder of Thor, 10
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had an important impact on the development of the doctor-patient
relationship.6
The doctrine's legal maturity occurred in two phases: the Era of Consent (roughly 1905 to 1930) and the Era of Informed Consent (roughly
1957 to present).7 Unfortunately, however, these periods of intense
development have done little to narrow the gap among jurisdictions with
respect to the development of any uniform standard for physician disclosure. Indeed, no general consensus prevails in this country over the scope
of a physician's duty to disclose medical information to his or her patient.
About twenty-five states adhere to the "professional-oriented" standard of
disclosure, which is defined in terms of the prevailing medical custom and
is established through expert testimony. An equal number of states
measure disclosure in terms of the "prudent patient" standard, or what a
reasonable patient would want and need to know prior to consenting to
treatment.8 Even though there is no clear majority position, the modem
trend9 has been towards adopting the prudent patient standard, primarily
because it is seen by many courts and commentators as more consistent
with the purpose of the doctrine, "which includes a respect for patient's
autonomy interest and a desire to have patients participate in the decision
making process."' 0 Still, Colorado courts have rejected this trend in favor
of the "old rule""l or physician-based standard, and the Colorado legisla12
ture has altogether withdrawn from the informed consent standard debate.

ISSUEs L. & MED. 261 (1994); Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The
Practitioner'sGuide to Informed Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L. REv. 881 (1991); Martin R.
Studer, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: Protectingthe Patient'sRight to Make Informed
Health Care Decisions, 48 MONT. L. REv. 85 (1987); D. Michael Wallach & Steven J.
Berry, Informed Consent in Texas: A Proposalfor Reasonableness and Predictability, 18
ST. MARY's L.J. 835 (1987); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); Elizabeth Sudbury Langston,
Note, Torts-Changes in the Arkansas Law of Informed Consent: What's Up Doc? Aronson
v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995), 19 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 263
(1997); Note, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 12 GA. L. REv. 581
(1978).
6.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 171.
7.
Id.
8.
See McNichols, supra note 5, at 716.
9.
See Bly v. Rhoades, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1976) (recognizing the
professional standard as the "modem trend"). See also LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039,
1044 n. 16 (La. 1983) (explaining that "[t]he trend in the law is away from a physician-based
standard to a patient-based standard").
10.
Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1257.
11.
LaCaze, 434 So. 2d at 1045.
12.
Colorado's "informed consent" statute has been repealed as follows: "The
repeal of this [statute] concerning informed consent to medical procedures shall not have the
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Thus, this article proposes to trace and analyze the rise of the doctrine
of informed consent generally and in Colorado in particular, and argues in
favor of adopting the reasonable patient standard in Colorado. Of course,
any such review must include the pivotal cases from other jurisdictions
from which the issues involving informed consent have developed in order
to better understand the doctrine's progression.
I. EARLY MEDICINE

Historical records reveal little about the disclosure and consent practices of early medical professionals. 13 The notion that a patient had a right
to consent to medical treatment was scarcely noted in ancient Greece,14 and
neither the Hippocratic Oath nor later codes of medical ethics emphasize

the idea of patient autonomy.' 5 What early tenets of medical care suggest,
however, is that communication between the doctor and patient was
encouraged, if at all, only insofar as it was necessary to persuade a patient
to follow a particular course of treatment.16 Even when there was
communication between the doctor and patient, it was deemed acceptable
for physicians to resort to unscrupulous tactics, if necessary, to persuade
the patient to accept treatment. 17 It was, simply put, the physician who
determined what course of treatment was in the patient's best interest, and

effect of invalidating any previous judicial decision relating to requirements for informed
consent or liability imposed for the lack thereof." CoLO. REv. STAT. §13-20-102 (2001).
Of those state legislatures that do have informed consent statutes, however, most have
adopted a physician-oriented standard. Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1252.
13.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 176.
14.
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 61.
15.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 176; W. John Thomas, Informed Consent, the
Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 313, 318 (2001).
As noted by one scholar, "[n]ever in the history of professionally articulated ethics had there
ever been any acknowledgment of the patient as a dignified agent free to participate in and
exercise self-determination over medical decisions. Not in the Hippocratic Oath, not in the
prayer of Maimonides, not in Percival's ethics, the codes of the AMA or the World Medical
Association." Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 176 (quoting Robert M. Veatch, Autonomy's
Temporary Triumph, HASTINGS CTR.REP., Oct. 1984, at 38).
16.
See Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 176. As the American Medical Association's
1847 Code of Ethics put it: "The obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physicians
should be prompt and implicit." Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1244. See also Thomas, supra note
15, at 318 (noting that "[tihe only reference to the issue [of informed consent] in the
Hippocratic Corpus advises against any conversation: 'perform [these] duties calmly and
adroitly, concealing most things from the patient while you are attending to him').
17.
KATZ, SILENT WoRLD, supra note 5, at 6-7. According to Katz, "[a]chievement
of these objectives demanded an emphasis on the need to be authoritative, manipulative, and
even deceitful." Id. at 7.
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the patient accepted the decision, usually without questioning the doctor's
or even understanding the condition or procedures for treating
conclusions,
8
it.

1

Even into the 19th Century, physicians did not believe that they
needed to communicate with their patients for the purpose of involving
them in the decision-making process. 19 The unfortunate result of such nondisclosure was that many early medical patients served as nothing more
that human guinea pigs, subjected to traditionally non-consensual medical
experimentation (such as poisoning, "bleeding, blistering, and violent
purging") 2°--therapy which often times proved ineffective or even
dangerous. 2' Not surprisingly, many such medical subjects were young
children, the indigent, and/or the mentally ill- in short, those members of
society susceptible to medical exploitation. But even assuming that
principled ideologies existed among physicians and the Hippocratic ideal

18.
Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654, 656-57 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972)); Kroft, supra note 5, at 457-58;
Charity Scott, Why Law PervadesMedicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 245, 263 (2000). Courts have acknowledged that some
patients even choose "to know nothing and instead rely completely upon the physician,"
even so far as to be "free to unwisely act in the dark." Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal.
App. 3d 1062 (1970) (involving a patient who told physician she preferred not to be told
about the proposed operation). In some contexts, it is asserted that there is even a right not
to know of medical illnesses. See generally Michael L. Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of
HIV Blood Test Results to the Individuals Tested: A Matter of Personal Choice Neglected,
22 Loy. U. Cmi. L.J. 445 (1991) (arguing that individuals with HIV have the right to not be
told about their positive status).
19.
Katz, supra note 3, at 7.
As one physician explained it, "[tihe American
physician of those days wielded less authority over his patients than did his European
colleagues; he had to endure too much quizzing, and he had to waste time in arguing
patients into acquiescence." Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 176 (quoting ARPAD G. GERsTER,
RECOLLECTIONS OF ANEW YORK SURGEON 163 (Paul B. Hoeber 1917)).
So entrenched were these historic views in the fabric of medical society in the
United States that the rights of patients to participate in medical decision-making began to
appear in American case law only in the 1950s, and still later in written medical ethics. See
id.; Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1244-45 ("It was not until 1980, almost 23 years after the
decision in Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., the apparent first case in this
country to recognize the concept of 'informed consent' that the AMA reluctantly acceded to
the new patient empowering principle.").
20.

KENNETH M. STAMPP, AMERICA IN 1857: A NATION ON THE BRINK 34 (Oxford

Univ. Press, 1990).
21.
See Marc A. Rodwin, PatientAccountabilityand Quality of Care: Lessons from
Medical Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights
Movements, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 152 (1994). See also DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T
I A WOMAN? 9-10 (1999) (recounting the "medical experimentation" performed on female
slaves in the Nineteenth Century).
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endured, this was little consolation to the patient. 22 This is because there
was little understanding during this time of how one could cure a medical
condition, and even less was known about what caused a particular
malady.2 3
However, this attitude-particularly among physicians-began to
change by the turn of the twentieth century. Advances in medical science,
technology, and training began to distinguish primitive medical practices
from conventional medicine.24 Funding for hospitals was on the rise.25
Educators and other activists were initiating much-needed reforms in the
standards, organization, and curriculum of American medical schools.26
Surgical techniques became more advanced.27 The use of anesthesia during
medical procedures was the norm rather than the exception, and hospitals
grew in size and prominence. 8 These changes, in turn, presented new
challenges within medicine regarding the long-standing professional
domination over medical care.29

22.
See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 9-10, 61-76.
23.
See Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 179. See also Katz, supra note 3, at 76 (stating
that "[d]uring the millennia of medical history, and until the beginning of the twentieth
century, physicians could not explain to their patients, or-from the perspective of
hindsight-to themselves, which of their treatment recommendations were curative and
which were not"); Harrman L. Blumgart, Caringfor the Patient, 270 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
449, 449 (1964) ("Somewhere between 1910 and 1912 in this country .... a random patient,
with a random disease, consulting a doctor chosen at random had, for the first time in the
history of mankind, a better than fifty-fifty chance of profiting from the encounter.").
24.
See Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 180; Bryan J. Warren, Comment, Pennsylvania
Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect PatientAutonomy Rights by Abandoning
the Battery Approach, 38 DuQ. L. REv. 917, 921 (2000).
25.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 183.
26.
Most commentators attribute the birth of modem medical education in North
America to the 1910 publication of the Abraham Flexner's "Flexner Report," in which
Flexner, an educator, criticized American medical schools as loosely organized, ineffective,
and greedy institutions lacking adequate standards for admission and educational content.
See generally Walter Wadlington, Breaking the Silence of Doctor and Patient, 93 YALE L.J.
1640(1984).
27.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 175-76.
28.
Id. at 176.
29.
Id. at 183; Warren, supra note 24, at 921. See also Katz, supra note 3, at 76
(noting that "the spectacular technological advances in the diagnosis and treatment of
disease, spawned by medical science, provided patients and doctors with ever-increasing
therapeutic options ... [which], for the first time in medical history, [made] it possible, even
medically and morally imperative, to give patients a voice in medical decisionmaking").
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III. EVOLUTION OF CONSENT (1905 - 1930)

By the early 1900s, the traditional deference given to physicians over
patient care began to give way to patient autonomy and the recognition by
courts that a doctor may be held liable for damages for performing an
operation without the consent of the patient.3 a One of the first reported
cases in which a doctor was sued by a patient on the basis of lack of
consent was Mohr v. Williams.3 In Mohr, a physician was given consent
to operate on the patient's right ear, but after the patient had been anesthetized the doctor reexamined the patient and decided to operate on the
patient's left ear. Although the surgery was a success, the patient brought
suit on the theory of assault and battery for an unauthorized contact.3 2 In
defense, the physician asserted that, since there was no evidence establishing hostile intent, assault and battery was not the proper cause of action.33
Rejecting the defendant's argument, the court stated: "If the operation was
performed without plaintiff's consent, and the circumstances were not such
as to justify its performance without, it was wrongful; and, if it was
wrongful, it was unlawful., 3 4 In other words, it is not the hostile intent of
the physician, but rather the absence of consent on the part of the patient to
treatment that constitutes the wrongful act.
The significance of Mohr was that it established three important principles in the context of medical-legal liability. First, it recognized for the
first time that physicians must obtain the consent of the patient before
performing a medical procedure. 5 Second, it emphasized the importance
of bodily integrity by providing a cause of action for even a "technical"
assault and battery. 6 Third, it established that any such cause of action
sounded in tort liability (battery), not negligence.3 7

30.
See Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 183 (noting that medial consent cases first began
to appear in American courts after 1904).
31.
104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). The Mohr court itself acknowledged the originality
of the issue before it: "This particular question is new in this state. At least, no case has
been called to our attention wherein it has been discussed or decided." Id. at 14.
32.
Id. at 13. Battery is defined as "[a] harmful or offensive contact with a person,
resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a contact,

or apprehension that such a contact is imminent." W. KEATON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).

33.
Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15-16.
34.
Id. at 16.
35.
Although Mohr is credited with being the first American case to recognize a
cause of action for an unauthorized touching in the medical context, it should be noted that
"[t]he common law over the centuries has always protected individuals from unwanted
contacts with their person." People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968 (Colo. 1985).
36.
"The common law action of battery developed out of the law's recognition of
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Following Mohr, other jurisdictions soon began to recognize a cause
of action for battery for the non-consensual touching of a patient. 38 Then,
in 1914, New York's highest court delivered a celebrated opinion that
would become the foundation of the doctrine of consent for the next fortysix years. In Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,39 the plaintiff
alleged that the doctor performed surgery contrary to the patient's express
direction. Specifically, the patient alleged that she had given consent to
have her stomach examined under anesthesia, but stated that she did not
wish to undergo an operation. Nevertheless, while the patient was
unconscious, the physician removed a fibroid tumor from the patient's
abdomen. Relying on the early battery decisions of Pratt v. Davis40 and
Mohr v. Williams,4' the court held in favor of the plaintiff. In doing so,
Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, set forth the definitive statement on a
patient's right to self-determination: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what can be done with his own
body, and a surgeon who continues to operate without the patient's consent
commits an assault for which he is liable for damages. 42
Exceptions to this general consent requirement do exist, however.
For instance, when an emergency requires immediate treatment for the
preservation of life or health, obtaining consent may be impracticable or
impossible. 44 Under this circumstance, the courts will imply the patient's
consent under the theory that a reasonable person in the patient's position
would have consented to treatment.4 5 Similarly, there is no duty to disclose
risks that are either already known to the patient or generally known by
everyone. 46 Nor is there a duty to disclose where, in the physician's

an individual's interest in personal autonomy and bodily integrity-that is, the right of a
person to participate in and make decisions about his own body." Id.
37.
See Shugrue & Linstromberg, supra note 5, at 882 (noting that historically
"where the patient had not consented to an invasion of his or her body, battery principles
would apply").
38.
See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906) (affirming a judgment for a
battery); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913) (physician operating without consent
liable for battery).
39.
105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
40.
79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
41.
104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
42.
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
43.
See APPELBAUM, Er AL., supra note 5, at 66.
44.
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508, 511 (S.D.
1978); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 309-10 (Wis. 1973).
45.
See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
46.
See Yeates v. Harms, 393 P.2d 982, 991 (Kan. 1964).
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full disclosure would be emotionally damaging to the patient's
opinion,
47
care.

Following Schloendorff, it soon became universally accepted that any
medical procedure involving the touching of a patient must be authorized
48
or the physician had committed the tort of battery. However, in an effort
to offset the potential harshness of this rule, courts gradually began to
accept the idea that such authorization may be conveyed either expressly or
impliedly. 49 For instance, express consent may be communicated by
signing a standardized "consent form" or more simply by saying "yes" or
"ok" when asked if the performance of a procedure is permitted. Likewise,
consent may also be implied from affirmative communication, or, as one
court put it, "any action on the part of the patient, including silence, that
[is] consistent with acceptance of treatment." 50
IV. COLORADO LAW ON CONSENT
Although the requirement of obtaining a patient's consent prior to
treatment was recognized as early as 1905,51 it was not until forty-five
years later that the Colorado Supreme Court would first touch on this issue
in Cady v. Fraser.52 In Cady, the plaintiff brought an action against a
physician for damages for alleged malpractice in treating a fractured
ankle.53 Unlike the early "battery principle" cases in which the plaintiff
would commonly assert only that the medical procedure had been carried
out without consent, the plaintiff in this case undertook to prove his battery
claim by asserting negligence. 54 The plaintiff claimed that the physician
persisted in treating his injured ankle even after the plaintiff had told the
defendant that he wanted the services of another physician. Thus, the
plaintiff argued that in continuing to treat the plaintiff's ankle in spite of his
protests, the defendant had committed malpractice similar to an assault and
battery.
In analyzing the facts of the case, the court determined that the crux of
the plaintiff's action was a claim for negligence, not treatment without
consent, for there was "no testimony that plaintiff at any time refused the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970).
See Wallach & Berry, supra note 5, at 837.
Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 161 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (La. 1983).
See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (Minn. 1905).
222 P.2d 422 (Colo. 1950).
Id. at 424.
Id.
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ministrations of defendant or suffered them unknowingly." 55 Quite the
contrary-the plaintiff's own testimony established that he accepted
treatment by the defendant without objection.56 Having established the
plaintiffs consent to treatment, the court proceeded to distinguish between
an action for malpractice based on negligence and an action for assault and
battery.57 According to the court:
The one is based on the existence of a contract and authority for service, and the other upon the lack of such contract
or authority. The one is based on lack of care or skill in
the performance or services contracted for, and the other
on wrongful trespass on the person regardless of the skill
or care employed. The assertion of one is a denial of the
other. Both cannot exist at the same time. 58
In short, because "the pleading of failure to use proper care necessarily implies authority to treat and negates trespass, ' 59 the court analyzed the
case on a negligence theory rather than the "lack of consent-battery theory"
as first set out in Mohr. In doing so, the court held that the defendant had
not committed malpractice because there was no evidence that he had
deviated from the standard of care and skill ordinarily exercised by like
physicians within the community. 60 Although Cady was ultimately decided
on a theory of negligence rather than tort, its historical importance is the
court's tacit recognition that an alleged "wrongful trespass on the person"
established in Colorado a cause of action for assault and battery for the
unauthorized touching of a patient by a physician. 61
Four years later, the Colorado Supreme Court would have the opportunity to more clearly articulate the doctrine of consent in Maercklein v.
Smith.6 2 In this case, the plaintiff consulted with Dr. Maercklein who
advised him that he was in need of a circumcision. Thereafter, the plaintiff
authorized Dr. Maercklein to perform the procedure. Once in surgery,
however, various "misunderstandings" between Dr. Maercklein and

55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Cady, 222 P.2d at 424.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
See Butler v. Molinski, 277 S.W.2d 448, 451-52 (Tenn. 1955) (recognizing a
cause of action for the "wrongful trespass on the person regardless of the skill or care
employed" by the physician) (citing Cady, 222 P.2d at 424).
62.
266 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1954).
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another physician, Dr. Postma, who actually performed the surgery,
resulted in the plaintiff undergoing a vasectomy rather than a circumcision,
which rendered the plaintiff sterile.6 3 Asserting that Dr. Maercklein had
violated the parties' contract of employment in that the operation agreed to
be performed was not done, while another, unrelated operation, was
completed, the plaintiff sued both physicians for negligence. 64 At trial, Dr.
Postma moved for a directed verdict and for the dismissal of the action
against him. The trial court denied the motion, and then entered a directed
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Dr. Postma appealed the trial court's denial
of his motion for dismissal.
The Colorado Supreme Court began its analysis by distinguishing the
case at bar from Cady. Unlike Cady, the instant case, said the court, "is
based on the existence of a contract and authority for service, while it was
the contention in the Cady case that no such contract existed., 65 Thus
Maercklein did not concern the professional competence of the defendant.
Rather, according to the court, "the gist of the action is defendants' alleged
wrongful and negligent act; not in lack of skill, but in that degree of care
which, as practitioners, they owed to their patient in the practice of their
profession. 66 In other words, the wrong complained of was not battery. It
was negligence.
The court next proceeded to articulate the law with respect to medical
consent. Here, the court specifically acknowledged that a physician who
performs an operation without the consent of the patient commits an assault
and battery for which he may be held accountable.67 However, since the
plaintiff here asserted that he had consented to treatment in the form of a
written contract, tort principles did not apply. Thus, the court was left to
determine whether the plaintiff's authorization for treatment by Dr.
Maercklein was sufficient to convey to Dr. Postma the permission or
authority to perform the procedure in question. The court determined that

63.
Id. at 1096.
64.
Id. at 1099.
65.
Id. at 1097.
66.
Id. at 1098. See generally Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114, 116 (Colo.
2001) (citing Maercklein v. Smith for the proposition that "[w]hen a claim seeking damages
for failure to perform professional services may sound in either tort or contract .... the trial
court must determine whether the 'gist of the action' is a claim for professional negligence").
67.
Maercklein, 266 P.2d at 1097. In doing so, the Cady court cited with approval
and quoted the following proposition from White v. Hirshfield, 236 P. 406 (Okla. 1925):
"Where a patient is under the care, treatment, and control of a physician, and an unnecessary
the elements of technical
operation is performed without the consent of such patient ....
assault and battery include malpractice and a violated duty upon the part of the physician to
his patient." Id. at 407. See also Kock v. Sadler, 759 P.2d 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
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it was. The court reasoned that since the evidence established that Dr.
Maercklein had "assured" Dr. Postma that he did have written, signed
consent from the plaintiff, Dr. Postma "took every precaution that was
reasonably required of him., 68 Moreover, there was no allegation that Dr.
Postma had negligently performed the operation. Indeed, Dr. Postma had
been instructed that he was to perform a vasectomy on the plaintiff, and he
did so in a skillful manner. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court
and dismissed the case against Dr. Postma.69
Just as the early cases of Mohr and Schloendorff confirmed the notion
that all medical procedures involving the touching of the patient's body
must be authorized to avoid a suit for battery, the later Colorado battery
cases of Cady and Maercklein similarly emphasize the difficulty some
courts encountered in determining whether to couch such actions in terms
of negligence or battery. In a pure battery cause of action, the procedure is
performed without notification by the doctor to the patient of the nature of
the treatment, and the patient may even be unaware that a procedure is
going to be performed.7 ° In a negligence cause of action, the nature of the
proposed treatment is disclosed to the patient, but risks of treatment and
available alternatives are not disclosed. 7'
Of more importance, perhaps, is the fact that none of the aforementioned cases considered whether the physician had given the patient enough
information to make an educated decision to undergo treatment or not. Or,
as one commentator cogently stated, these decisions "neither invited nor
required a sophisticated examination of the relationship between disclosure
and consent, on the one hand, and self-determination, on the other., 72 For
these reasons, courts gradually began to turn their attention from whether
the procedure was authorized to whether the battery cause of action
coincided with the theoretical framework of consent liability and if the
consent was "informed."
V. THE ERA OF INFORMED CONSENT (1957

-

PRESENT)

As noted earlier, the doctor-patient relationship has historically been
one of benevolence and paternalism. 73 Well into the 19th Century, it was

68.
69.
70.
71.
denied, 409
72.
73.

Maercklein, 266 P.2d at 1100.
Id.
See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
U.S. 1064 (1972).
KATZ, SLENT WoRLD, supra note 5, at 52.
Scott, supra note 18, at 263.
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generally assumed that physicians, as medical experts, were more qualified
than patients to determine what was in a patient's best interest, and that
patients had neither the interest nor capacity to participate in medical
decision-making.74 Even at the turn of the century, the conviction that
physicians should decide what was best for their patients continued to have
a firm hold on the practices of the medical profession. By the late 1920s,
however, case law had established that consent was limited to the course of
action specified by the patient, and nothing more.75 In other words, if a
physician went beyond the procedure the patient agreed to, he had
committed the tort of assault and battery.
As the century progressed, advances in medical technology and techniques placed physicians in a powerful new role.76 With physicians armed
with more understanding about the causes and treatments of disease, courts
began to examine the quantity of information they provided to patients and
whether patients had been informed as to the risks, benefits, and available
alternatives to the proposed medical treatments.77 Thus began the era of
"informed consent."
The first case to adopt the notion of informed consent was the 1957
decision of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.78 In
this case, the plaintiff became permanently paralyzed after undergoing a
thoracic aortography. Even though paralysis was a rare complication
associated with this procedure, the plaintiff sued the physician for
negligently failing to warn him of the inherent risks of the surgery.79
Finding for the plaintiff and against the defendant on the basis of negligence, the California Court of Appeals held for the first time that, not only
was the patient's consent required, but that physicians had a duty to
disclose all facts that were necessary for the patient to make an intelligent

74.
Rodwin, supra note 21, at 151-52.
75.
Szczygiel, supra note 4, at 188.
76.
Id.
77.
"The law of informed consent emerged from the law of battery, which was
applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician." People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968
(Colo. 1985). Generally speaking, the informed consent doctrine embodies three primary
goals: (1) the ethical goal-which embraces the principle that an individual has a right to
make health care decisions affecting their own bodies; (2) the regulatory goal-which
regulates the disclosure practices of medical professionals; and (3) the compensatory goalwhich attempts to provide financial compensation for personal injuries suffered due to a
lack of informed consent. Kroft, supra note 5, at 463-64.
78.
317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). See Arabian, supra note 5, at 262 n.5
(noting that the term informed consent is generally attributed to Salgo v. Leland); Shugrue
& Lindstromberg, supra note 5, at 893 ("One of the first cases to address the physician's
duty to disclose by adopting the term 'informed consent' was Salgo v. Leland .
.
79.
Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
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heath care decision. 80 According to the Salgo court, "[a] physician violates
his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any
facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment." 81 At the same time, however, the court
also recognized that the physician must balance the duty to disclose
information against the duty to withhold information that would be likely to
unduly alarm an already apprehensive patient. 82
In essence, then, Salgo articulated two competing considerations with
respect to the law of informed consent: (1) the requirement of "full
disclosure;" and (2) the need for judicial deference to medical discretion in
some cases. 83 The central question thus became what constituted "full
disclosure" by the physician sufficient for the patient to make an informed
choice. Yet an even more basic question left open by the Salgo court's
opinion was whether this newly-announced doctrine was to be couched in
terms of battery or negligence.
In response to these questions, two schools of thought have emerged:
the "professional" or "physician" standard and the "materiality" or
"patient" standard. Each standard is predicated upon entirely different
rationales. The professional standard focuses on what a reasonable
physician would disclose in the same or similar circumstances. 84 In
contrast, the patient standard focuses on what information a reasonable
patient would consider important in order to make an informed medical
decision.85

80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Boland, supra note 5, at 7.
84.
Festa v. Greenberg, 511 A.2d 1371, 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). See, e.g.,
Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) (stating compliance with
community standard provides a valid defense to nondisclosure of facts); DiFilippo v.
Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 336 (Del. 1961) (stating general rule that the physician is bound to
the same standards as a physician in a similar community); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d
1123, 1129 (Me. 1980) (professional standard measures scope of disclosure in many
jurisdictions); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965) (holding malpractice
requirement is professional standard).
85.
LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1045 (La. 1983). See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy,
379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Md. 1977) (materiality test focuses on patient's right of selfdetermination). Accord Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982); Harnish v.
Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446
(W. Va. 1982).
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A. THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARD

As noted above, the doctrine of informed consent traces its origins to
the common law notion that an adult has a "right to determine what shall be
done with his own body. 86 Originally founded on the common law tort
of assault and battery, it did not take long for courts to recognize that the
battery theory of liability did not clearly fit within the framework of
informed consent.8 7 Or, as stated by Marjorie Shultz, "[o]nce courts began
more thoroughly to examine the subtleties of the doctor-patient relationship, the difficulties inherent in applying battery analysis to problems of
medical consent became impossible to ignore. 88 Namely, "the failure to
inform a patient is probably not, in the usual case, an intentional act and
hence not within the traditional concept of intentional torts; ' 89 nor do such
informed consent cases adequately reflect the fact that patients "consent"
on some level whenever they see a doctor. 90 As a result, negligence-the
doctor's failure to exercise reasonable care to a patient--eventually
replaced intentional battery as the theoretical underpinning for the doctrine.
The first case to base informed consent liability on a negligence theory rather than a battery theory was the Kansas Supreme Court case of
Natanson v. Kline.91 In this case, the plaintiff had consented to radiation
therapy after a mastectomy to prevent the recurrence of cancer, and was
injured by the radiation. She claimed in her suit against the physician that
she had not been warned of the risks of the radiation treatment. 92 In this
landmark decision, the court held that the physician's disclosure was
legally inadequate in that the physician's duty extended beyond merely
disclosing the risks of treatment. According to the court, "[the physician]
was obligated to make a reasonable disclosure to the [patient] of the nature
and probable consequences of the suggested or recommended . . . treatment, and ... a reasonable disclosure of the dangers within his knowledge

which were incident to, or possible in, the treatment he proposed to

86.
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
87.
See Schultz, supra note 5, at 224-25.
88.
Id. at 225.
89.
Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973). See also Schultz,
supra note 5, at 225; Warren, supra note 24, at 944.
90.
Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 77 (Wis. 1995). See also Schultz, supra
note 5, at 225; Warren, supra note 24, at 944.
91.
350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), modified as to another issue, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960). See Studer, supra note 5, at 88 (crediting Natanson with being the first case to
articulate the professional standard).
Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1100-01.
92.
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administer." 93 Thus, the Natanson court tacitly rejected the "full disclosure" standard set forth in Salgo in favor of a lesser "reasonable disclosure"
standard.
The court further announced that the scope of such disclosure is to be
determined by the "reasonable physician" standard, meaning those
disclosures that a reasonable practitioner would make under the same or
similar circumstances. 94 Moreover, except in cases of gross negligence so
obvious as to be within the common knowledge of jurors,95 expert medical
testimony is necessary to establish the scope of legally adequate disclosure
under the professional standard since the determination of what constitutes
informed consent is considered a medical decision.96 At the same time,
those jurisdictions that have adopted the Natanson professional standard
differ on who may offer expert testimony. Some jurisdictions apply the
"locality rule," which limits expert testimony to those professionals
practicing the same profession within the same locality.97 However, in
recent years, a growing number of jurisdictions have opted for a "national
standard," which applies to those physicians practicing the same specialty
in the same or similar community.9 8 Under either standard, however, the

93.
Id. at 1106.
94.
Id. at 1107.
95.
See, e.g., Hales v. Pitmann, 576 P.2d 493, 498 (Ariz. 1978) (recognizing
exception to expert testimony in cases of gross negligence); Melville v. Southward, 791
P.2d 383, 387 (Colo. 1990) (recognizing exception to expert testimony for actions that lie
"within the ambit of common knowledge or experience of ordinary persons"); Revord v.
Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (no requirement for expert testimony
regarding disclosure if situation within "realm of laymen's comprehension").
96.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1376. See also Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 914 (Colo.
1982) ("The precise scope of the physician's duty of disclosure is determined on the basis of
expert testimony demonstrating the extent of information given by reasonably careful
physicians practicing the same specialty in the same or similar community.").
97.
Foose v. Haymond, 310 P.2d 722, 726 (Colo. 1957). See, e.g., Larson v.
Lindahl, 450 P.2d 77, 78 (Colo. 1968) (applying community standard rule to medical
malpractice actions); LaCaze v. Collier, 434 So. 2d 1039, 1044-45 (La. 1983) (community
standard traditional rule in malpractice action); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783, 788-89 (Va.
1976) (community standard in "locality rule" upheld). See generally Jon R. Waltz, The Rise
and Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L.
REv. 408 (1969).
98.
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520-21 (Colo. 1992). See, e.g.,
Martin v. Bralliar, 540 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (following national standard);
Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 914 (Colo. 1982) (same); Guebard v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d
751, 757 (Il1. App. Ct. 1983) (same); Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ohio 1976)
(locality rule no longer justified due to conformity of practice). See also R. Jo Reser &
Barbara A. Radnofsky, New Wave of Tainted Blood Litigation: Hepatitis C Liability Issues,
67 DEF. COuNS. J. 306, 313 (2000) (recognizing that "[t]he 'locality rule' for measuring the
standard of care for physicians and health care providers is being abandoned").
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new physician-based theory of recovery established in Natanson proved to
be a popular theme, as the majority of jurisdictions99 and medical professionals alike supported it.'O
B. THE REASONABLE PATIENT STANDARD

Over time, critics began to question the professional standard first
articulated in Natanson, denouncing it as inconsistent with the notion of
patient autonomy.'0 ' With this in mind, courts soon began fashioning a
more patient-friendly standard of disclosure-the "materiality" or
"reasonable patient" standard. The first case to adopt such a standard was
Canterbury v. Spence.'0 2 In this case, the plaintiff sued for personal

99.
See Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 672 (Haw. 1995) (recognizing Canterbury
as the majority rule). The professional standard of disclosure has been adopted in the
following cases: Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Fuller v. Starnes, 597
S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1980); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982); Coleman v.
Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Brown v.
Wood, 202 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw.
1970); Ziegert v. S. Chi. Cmty. Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450 (I11. App. Ct. 1981); Kranda v.
Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Tatro v. Lueken, 512
P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Marchlewicz v.
Stanton, 213 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Cress v. Mayer, 626 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); Llera v. Wisner, 557 P.2d 805 (Mont. 1976); Folger v. Corbett, 394 A.2d 63
(N.H. 1978); Butler v. Berkeley, 213 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); German v.
Nichopoulos, 577 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783 (Va.
1976); Stundon v. Stadnik, 469 P.2d 16 (Wyo. 1970). See also McNichols, supra note 5, at
716-17 (describing state trends). See generally Heinemann, supra note 4, at 1082-86
(discussing patient-oriented standard and describing trends).
100.
Not surprisingly, the physician-based theory of recovery was endorsed by
medical professionals for the simple reason that it reflected the notion that the "doctor
knows best." As stated by one court, the physician's duty of full disclosure is premised
upon the sentiment "that unlike the physician, the patient is untrained in medical science,
and therefore depends completely on the trust and skill of his physician for the information
on which he makes his decision." Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1020 (Md. 1977).
101.
By the early 1970s, a growing number of courts began to assert "that protection
of the patient's fundamental right of physical self-determination-the very cornerstone of
the informed consent doctrine-mandates that the scope of a physician's duty to disclose
risks and alternatives be governed by the patient's informational needs." Sard, 379 A.2d at
1021. Accord Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Revord v. Russell, 401 S.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Harnish v. Children's
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash.
1974), aff'd per curiam, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446
(W.Va. 1982). See also Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 672 (Haw. 1995) (noting that the
"reasonable man" standard has been criticized by some commentators as backtracking on its
own theory of self-determination).
102.
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Festa, 511 A.2d at 1374 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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injuries allegedly suffered by a negligently performed laminectomy and
negligent post-operative care. He also claimed that the defendant was
negligent in failing to disclose a serious risk of paralysis inherent in the
operation, which in fact materialized. 0 3 On appeal, the court reversed the
trial court's directed verdict in favor of the physician and held that the
patient had raised sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury. In
reaching this result, the court rejected the professional standard of
disclosure as articulated in Natanson, claiming that it vitiated the patient's
right of self-determination. 104 In justifying its decision, the Canterbury
court held that the physician's duty to disclose arose from three considerations: (1) every human being has a right to determine his own course of
medical treatment; (2) for consent to be real the patient must be given an
opportunity to evaluate the options available and all associated risks; and
(3) the average patient has minimal understanding of medicine, and thus
can only seek guidance from a physician. 0 5 Accordingly, Canterbury
makes clear that the law, not medical custom, must define the standard of
disclosure with respect to the plaintiffs right of self-determination.
Therefore, "the test for determining whether a particular peril must be
divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentiality
affecting the decision must be unmasked. . . ."06 Put differently, the court
determined that the objective standard should be measured by what a
reasonable person in the patient's position would deem material under the
circumstances involved. Other courts have agreed. 1°
The Canterburycourt next proceeded to define the term "material." A
risk is material "when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the p1atient's position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk "Or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to
forgo the proposed therapy."'' 0 8 Moreover, the physician must discuss the
nature of the proposed treatment, whether it is necessary or merely elective,

1986) (stating that "[t]he case which propelled the patient need standard to the forefront was
Canterburyv. Spence").
103.
Canterbury,464 F.2d at 778.
104.
Id. at 784.
105.
Id. at 780.
106.
Id. at 786-87.
107.
"[Tlhe reasonable patient standard] better respects the patient's right of self
determination and affixes the focus of the inquiry regarding the standard of disclosure on the
motivating force and purpose of the doctrine of informed consent-aiding the individual
patient in making an important decision regarding medical care." Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d
489,499 (Haw. 1995).
108.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (citing Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman,
Informed Consentto Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 640 (1970)).
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the risks, and the available alternatives and their risks and benefits.' °9 The
objective reasonable patient standard therefore requires more information
to be disclosed than the professional standard, but does not require the
physician to disclose all the risks, benefits, alternatives and the nature of
treatment."l 0 To do so would require "[a] mini-course in medical science
[which] is not required," said the court.''
Furthermore, since the scope of this new standard is measured by what
a prudent patient would want to know to make an informed decision, no12
medical judgment is involved and expert testimony is unnecessary.'
Clearly, as one court notes, the "[d]etermination[s] of what a reasonable
man would do or consider significant within the context of a particular set
of facts is standard fare for jurors, for which they need no expert assistance."' 13 Because the Canterbury patient-based standard relies on the
jury's perception of a "reasonable patient" rather than expert testimony, it
is generally regarded as making it easier for plaintiffs to prevail in
malpractice actions." 4 Against this backdrop, the patient-based
standard of
115
disclosure soon became the prevailing minority view.

109.
See generallyid.
110.
See Studer, supra note 5, at 92.
111.
Canterbury,464 F.2d at 787 n.84.
112.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1376.
113.
Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 651 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
114.
See Festa, 511 A.2d at 1374 (noting that "the 'prudent patient' standard may
allow some plaintiffs to recover more easily").
115.
The following jurisdictions have followed the "reasonable patient" standard:
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294
(Conn. 1983); Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Cowman v.
Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1983); Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So.
2d 1289 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1977); Sard v. Hardy, 379
A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass.
1982); Cornfeldt v. Tongen 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488
(Miss. 1987); Largey v. Rotman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180
(N.M. 1978); Congrove v. Holmes, 308 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1973); Scott v. Bradford, 606
P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Getchell v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953 (Or. 1971); Cooper v. Roberts,
286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972);
Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D. 1978); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d
852 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); aff'd, 530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975). But see Cross v. Trapp, 294
S.E.2d 446 (W.Va. 1982); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1973).
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VI. INFORMED CONSENT IN COLORADO

The Colorado position on informed consent was first articulated in the
1970 Supreme Court decision of Mallett v. Pirkey.116 In this case, the court
rejected the minority view expressed in Canterbury in favor of the
"professional standard" established in Natanson, and affirmed the lower
court's jury instructions on the lack of informed consent issue that had
resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Here the plaintiff, a sixyear-old boy, was taken to the defendant physician after repeated throat and
ear infections. Upon examining the plaintiff, the defendant recommended
removing the plaintiff's tonsils, immediately followed by an experimental
injection procedure. However, the defendant failed to discuss the risks of
the injection procedure with the plaintiff or his parents.'7
Following surgery, the plaintiff lost his vision as a result of the experimental injection. Thereafter, the plaintiff's mother brought suit against
the defendant for negligence. She argued that she had not given her
consent to the experimental injection that was performed since she was not
told that the procedure would be used, let alone the risks associated with it.
All of the plaintiff's claims were premised upon the notion that the
defendant knew or should have known that the procedure was hazardous,
and that he should have told the plaintiff's mother
of such risks at the time
18
he obtained her signed consent as guardian.'
On the issue of informed consent, the trial court instructed the jury on
the physician's duty to "generally inform his patient as to the procedures to
be followed and the risks involved therein,"' 19 and, by separate instruction,
told the jury of the physician's "duty to inform such patient of the risks that
are known or ought to have been known to the physician."' 12 Thus, one of
the issues on appeal was whether the trial court had properly instructed the
jury. In ruling on the adequacy of these instructions, the Mallett court
stated:
The instructions collectively state that a physician has the
affirmative duty to inform a patient about to undergo surgery in a general way as to the procedures he will follow

116.
466 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1970). See also Goedecke v. Dept. of Insts., 603 P.2d 123,
125 (Colo. 1979) (citing Mallett for the proposition that "[t]he courts of this state have long
acknowledged the physician's obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent ... .
117.
Mallett, 466 P.2d at 468.
118.
Id. at 467-68.
119.
Id. at 472.
120.
Id. at 472-73.
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and the risks involved in those procedures; he also has a
duty to inform a patient of any substantial risk of a procedure which he is to perform and of specific risks, if such
21
risks are known or ought to be known by him.1
These instructions, said the court, accurately conveyed the law as set
forth in Natanson v. Kline.' 22
For that reason, the rule set forth in
Natanson-namely, that "the duty of the physician to disclose.., is limited
to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances" 123_ was followed by the Mallett
court and established the Colorado rule of law with respect to informed
consent. The Mallett court further made clear that, as stated in Natanson,
the substantiality of any particular risk must be determined on the basis of
expert medical testimony. 124 This requirement is based on the judicial
belief that matters relating to medical diagnosis and treatment involve a
high degree of medical knowledge
and skill beyond the common knowl125
edge or experience of laypersons.

121.
Id. at 473.
122.
350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), modified as to another issue, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960). See also Hale v. Morris, 725 P.2d 26, 28 (Colo. 1986) ("A claim for lack of
informed consent sounds in negligence."); Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971) ("Colorado has elected to follow the more generally accepted theory set forth in
Natanson v. Kline .... which applies negligence principles to the informed consent aspect of
actions of this nature.") (citing Mallett, supra).
123.
Mallett,466 P.2d at 473.
124.
Id. at 471.
125.
Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383 (Colo. 1990); Greenwell v. Gill, 660 P.2d
1305, 1307 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) ("This principle acknowledges the practical problems
faced by fact-finders in seeking to apply an objective test of 'reasonable conduct' to the
sphere of medical activity."). See also Hamilton v. Thompson 23 P.3d 114 (Colo. 2001)
(requiring that evidence of medical malpractice cases be established by expert testimony);
United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520 (Colo. 1992) ("Because in most cases
of professional negligence the applicable standard is not within the common knowledge and
experience of ordinary persons, the applicable standard must be established by expert
testimony."). It should be noted, however, that expert testimony is not necessary in all
contexts.
For example, a plaintiff alleging lack of informed consent does not necessarily
have to present expert testimony to establish his or her claim. The duty of care in such cases
arises from the general principle of full disclosure, which is a principle not particular to any
one profession. Thus, in establishing a prima facia case, a plaintiff need not present expert
testimony, only demonstrate that the physician failed to disclose information. In contrast,
expert medical testimony is necessary to establish the defense of conformance with
standards of professional practice or the failure to meet such standards. Gorab v. Zook, 943
P.2d 423, 427 n.5 (Colo. 1997).
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Having recognized the physician's duty to disclose in some cases,
subsequent Colorado decisions broadened and refined the rules for
disclosure. In Stauffer v. Karabin,126 for example, decided only one year
after Mallett v. Pirkey,127 the question was whether the physician should
have informed the plaintiff prior to surgery of the possible complications
and alternative modes of treatment associated with a hysterectomy
operation. The trial judge entered a verdict in favor of the defendant and
the patient appealed. The plaintiff s principle complaint on appeal was that
the trial court had erred in not granting her motion for directed verdict since
the defendant admittedly did not inform her of the advantages and potential28
complications of the procedure or the alternative methods of treatment.
As to this claim, the defendant offered expert testimony at trial that his
failure to inform the plaintiff of the possible complications following
surgery and alternative treatments was consistent with the prevailing
community standards of disclosure.
Citing Mallett, the court began by stating that "Colorado has elected to
follow the more generally accepted theory set forth in Natanson v.
Kline."'129 The court went on to note that "[u]nder this theory, it is not
mandatory for a physician to make full and competent disclosure in all
cases and under all circumstances, as disclosure of all risks has been found
to be impracticable."'' 30 Rather, a lack of informed consent claim involves
a shifting of burdens.
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facia case by showing that
he or she was uninformed at the time of the consent due to a failure to
disclose by the physician.' 3 ' Then, once evidence has been established that
the patient was uninformed due to nondisclosure, the burden is on the
physician to come forward with expert testimony establishing that the
nondisclosure conformed with community or, if appropriate, national
medical standards of care. 132 In applying this standard to the facts of the
case, the court found that "[w]here, as here, defendant presented evidence

126.
492 P.2d 862 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
127.
466 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1970).
128.
Stauffer, 492 P.2d at 865.
129.
Id.
130.
Id. (citing Scott v. Wilson, 412 S.W. 2d 299 (Tex. 1967)).
131.
Stauffer, 492 P.2d at 865. See also Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2003).
132.
Stauffer, 492 P.2d at 865. See also Gorab v. Zook, 943 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1997)
(noting evidentiary differences between patient-oriented informed consent and medical
community standard of care).
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that his failure to inform was consistent with community standards,"
33 the
issue becomes one for the jury and a directed verdict is unwarranted.1
With the recognition in Stauffer that it is unrealistic to require that a
physician advise his patient of all conceivable risks of a particular
procedure, the issue then became under what circumstances should a
particular risk be disclosed? That was one of the questions before the
Colorado Supreme Court in Bloskas v. Murray.134 In Bloskas, the plaintiff
received a fractured ankle after being thrown from a horse. He subsequently underwent surgery to reduce the fracture and have a screw inserted
into his ankle. After developing severe arthritis, the plaintiff consulted
with the defendant physician for the purpose of determining whether to
have a total ankle replacement. After consultation, the defendant recommended, and the plaintiff consented to undergo, ankle replacement surgery.
Following surgery, the plaintiff's ankle became infected and, when
treatment proved unsuccessful, the defendant removed the artificial
replacement and later made four unsuccessful attempts to fuse the ankle.
Due to subsequent infections,
plaintiff's right leg eventually had to be
135
amputated below the knee.
The plaintiff filed suit against the physician, alleging lack of informed
consent and negligent misrepresentation. For our purposes, however, it is
only important to discuss the claim surrounding lack of informed consent.
As to this claim, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury that the defendant was only required to disclose the "substantial
risks" of ankle replacement surgery rather than extending that warning to
include the "special risks" of surgery.' 36 The trial court testimony
established that the defendant physician had no recollection of informing
the plaintiff of the risks and dangers associated with the surgical procedure.
Nevertheless, the physician was allowed to testify that he routinely advised
his patients of the risks of undergoing such procedures. The jury returned137a
verdict for the defendant and the court of appeal affirmed that decision.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
defendant had secured a valid informed consent to the operation from the
plaintiff.
In considering the propriety of the trial court's instructions on informed consent, Justice Quinn, writing for the court, reviewed the historical
development of the doctrine of informed consent. He observed that the law

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Stauffer, 492 P.2d at 865.
646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 909.
Id. at 912.
Id. at 911.
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of informed consent emerged from the law of battery, and that a physician
who performs a procedure on a patient without their consent, or performs a
procedure different from that consented to, is liable for battery. 138
The court then proceeded to reexamine the holding in Mallett v.
Pirkey139 in light of plaintiff's argument that the defendant's duty to warn
included not only "substantial risks" of the surgery but also extended to
"special risks" of the surgical procedure. 4° The court found that no such
argument could be gleaned from the Mallett decision. According to the
'4
court, "the plaintiffs misapprehend the thrust of the Mallett decision."' 1
The court elaborated thusly:
While it is impossible for a physician to advise a patient of
all conceivable risks, Mallett recognizes that where the risk
is one that would be medically significant to the patient's
surgical decision, and the risk is known or ought to be
known by the physician, then it is 4a2 "substantial" risk and
should be disclosed to the patient. 1
Therefore, since the trial court "basically informed [the jury] that substantial risks are those which a physician knows or ought to know would be
significant to a patient's decision whether or not to submit to a surgical
procedure," the instructions sufficiently conveyed to the jury the applicable
standards upon which to base the plaintiffs claim of lack of informed
consent. 4 3 The Bloskas court further reaffirmed Mallett insofar as it held

138.
Id. at 914. See also Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 n.4 (1982) ("[T]he right
to refuse any medical treatment emerged from the doctrine of trespass and battery, which
were applied to unauthorized touchings by a physician."); Espander v. Cramer, 903 P.2d
1171, 1173 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) ("A physician who operates on a patient without the
patient's consent, or who performs an operation different from that to which the patient
consented, commits a battery and is liable for damages resulting therefrom, notwithstanding
the exercise of reasonable care in performing the operation.").
139.
466 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1970).
140.
Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 912. The plaintiff's argument here rested with the Mallett
court's holding "that a physician has the affirmative duty to inform a patient about to
undergo surgery in a general way as to the procedures he will follow and the risks involved
in those procedures; he also has a duty to inform a patient of any substantial risk of a
procedure which he is to perform and of the specific risks, if such risks are known or ought
to be known by him." Mallett, 466 P.2d at 473.
141.
Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 912.
142.
Id. at 913. See also Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthtone, L.L.C.,
95 P.3d 571, 587 (Colo. 2004) (citing Bloskas for proposition that disclosure of "substantial
risks" of the procedure is required).
143.
Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 913. See also Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392 (Colo. Ct.
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that the substantiality of a particular risk must be determined on the basis of
expert testimony. 144 Accordingly, no further instructions were required and
the court upheld the jury verdict for the defendant on the lack of informed
consent claim. 145
Since the 1970 decision in Mallett, the Colorado approach to informed
consent has been relatively consistent, with one notable exception. As
mentioned earlier, many jurisdictions disagree over whether to apply the
so-called "locality rule" or the national standard of disclosure in informed
consent cases. (Recall that the locality rule applies to those practicing the
same profession in the same locality while the national standard applies to
those practicing the same specialty in the same or similar community).
Over the years, Colorado case law has reflected this dichotomy. 146 Some
cases have adopted the locality rule, 47 while other cases have applied the
national standard. 148 Still other cases refer to a national community and
state that a national standard, where applicable, is appropriate when
evaluating the particular professional community standard of care. 149 Thus
Colorado courts apply the standard on a case-by-case basis, articulating no
purely legal standard of materiality, leaving materiality as a question of fact
for the jury.
However, Colorado, like other states, has abandoned the locality rule
in cases concerning specialists. 150 In Jordan v. Bogner,151 the Colorado
Supreme Court observed that the locality rule bears no relationship to a

App. 2003) (noting that physicians are only required to inform patients of substantial risks).
144.
Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 914. See also Quintana, 827 P.2d at 520 ("Because in
most cases of professional negligence the applicable standard is not within the common
knowledge and experience of ordinary persons, the applicable standard must be established
by expert testimony."); Williams, 72 P.2d at 399 (noting that "the plaintiff has the burden of
presenting expert testimony to show that the specific risk was substantial.. ."); Siepierski v.
Catholic Health Initiative Mtn. Region, 37 P.3d 537, 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) ("Generally,
expert testimony is necessary to prevail on a claim of professional negligence against a
physician or other trained medical professional.").
145.
Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 913.
146.
See Quintana, 827 P.2d at 520 ("Colorado case law reflects several positions
with respect to the compass of the professional community by which a professional standard
of care is to be established.").
147.
Id. See, e.g., Williams, 72 P.3d 392; Foose v. Haymond, 310 P.2d 722, 726
(Colo. 1957).
148.
Quintana, 827 P.2d at 520. See, e.g., Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 914; Martin v.
Bralliar, 540 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
149.
Quintana, 827 P.2d at 520. See, e.g., Mallett, 466 P.2d at 471; Stauffer, 492
P.2d at 865.
150.
See, e.g., Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985).
151.
844 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1993).
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physician who holds himself out as a specialist. 52 Accordingly, the
applicable standard of care for certified specialists is measured against53the
knowledge and skill of other physicians practicing that same specialty.1
VII. THE CASE FOR ADOPTING A PATIENT-BASED STANDARD

As evident from the preceding discussion, the focus of informed consent law in Colorado is on physician disclosure rather than patient
understanding. 54 Here, Colorado is joined by roughly half of the other
states in limiting the liability of physicians to circumstances in which the
doctor failed to disclose risks that would have been disclosed by a
reasonable medical practitioner under the same or similar circumstances.
To require physicians to discuss every possible risk involved in a given
medical procedure, say Colorado courts, is impractical 155 or even confusing. 156 But are such justifications defensible? Is informing a patient of the
risks and alternatives of a medical procedure really an impractical or even
confusing endeavor? Arguably not.
First, Colorado courts contend that adopting the reasonable patient
standard would force the physician to bombard the patient with needless
medical concerns and substantially undermine the physician's primary duty
of determining what form of treatment best suits the patient. 57 But that is
not the case. The patient standard does not compel full and complete
disclosure of every conceivable risk; rather, a physician fulfills his or her
responsibility upon disclosure of the material risks which a reasonable
physician would make under the same or similar circumstances. That
means risks that the patient would likely attach significance to in deciding
whether or not to undergo treatment. As the Canterburycourt makes clear:

152.
Id. at 666. See also Orcutt v. Miller, 595 P.2d 1191, 1194 (Nev. 1979) (holding
that a board-certified specialist should be held to national standards of the specialty rather
than the locality rule).
153.
Jordan, 844 P.2d at 666 (citing Short v. Kinkade, 685 P.2d 210, 211 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983)). See also Bloskas, 646 P.2d at 914 (Colo. 1982) (finding that "a claim in
medical malpractice requires proof that the physician failed to exercise that degree of
knowledge, skill and care used by other physicians practicing the same specialty").
154.
See In re Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 567, 575 (D.
Colo. 1980) ("In duty to disclose cases, the focus of attention is on the physician's
divulgence rather than the patient's understanding.").
155.
Stauffer v. Karabin, 492 P.2d 862, 865 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
156.
In re Swine Flu, 533 F.Supp. at 576 (citing Niblack v. United States, 438 F.
Supp. 383, 389 (D. Colo. 1979)).
157.
Festa v. Greenberg, 511 A.2d 1371, 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
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The topics importantly demanding a communication of information are the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any,
and the results likely if the patient remains untreated. The
factors contributing significance to the dangerousness of a
the incidence of injury
medical technique are, of course, 58
and the degree of harm threatened.
Clearly, there is no bright-line rule separating the material from the
immaterial; it is decided on the basis of "rule of reason," that is, when nondisclosure of a particular risk is open to debate, disclosure is appropriate. 159
Furthermore, the rationale for disclosing more rather than less information
is supported by both ethical and statistical considerations. First, the
foundation of a physician's duty to disclose in the first place is that "it is
the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself
the direction in which his interests seem to lie."'160 Second, erring on the
side of more disclosure means that a physician is susceptible only to the
most obscure of medical catastrophes. In other words, if a well-prepared
list excludes only the rarest of medical risks (e.g., 1 per 100,000 cases), the
probability that such an event would both occur and be absent from the list
is much less than 1 per 100,000 cases. Thus, the more a patient knows
about treatment risks the less likely his or her treatment options will fall
outside of the protected (or disclosed) information.
Second, some critics of the patient standard argue that, since the reasonable patient standard is based on the concept of the objective "reasonable patient," if an individual patient's needs differ from that of the
hypothetical reasonable patient, then the reasonable patient standard fails to
provide any protection. 161
In other words, "the 'reasonable patient'
162
standard begs the question of what, and who, is a reasonable patient."
Indeed, because health care decisions are highly personal, individual
patients are likely to approach such questions with their own interests in

158.
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972).
159.
Id. at 788.
160. Id. at 781.
161.
Aaron D. Twerski & Niel B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 618 (1988);
Heinemann, supra note 4, at 1083.
162.
Susan K. Ketler, Note, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A CulturalAnalysis of
the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schrieber v. Physicians Insurance Co. of Wisconsin,
95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1029, 1038 (2001).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

mind.' 63 Thus, argue the critics, the reasonable patient standard ignores the
patient's rights to make irrational health care decisions. 64 To be sure, to
the extent that an individual plaintiff would have made an irrational health
care decision, his or her claim may be negatively affected as adjudged
under the reasonable patient standard. But therein lies the attractiveness of
the reasonable patient approach-that is, it provides due regard for the
patient's informational needs while also providing suitable leeway for the
physician's situation. Neither side is too vulnerable to extremes.
Third, proponents of the professional standard contend that only the
physician is in the best position to effectively determine the psychological
impact that such disclosure would have on a particular patient. Accordingly, it should be up to the physician to properly evaluate the patient's
health and determine whether the risks involved are remote or real concerns
that should be disclosed. 165 This argument is misplaced. At its core, the
notion of informed consent is predicated upon patient autonomy and serves
to protect the patient's right to make his or her own health care decisions.
The doctrine recognizes that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not the
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests
seems to lie."' 166 Furthermore, to say that patients are unable to appreciate

163.
Id. This objective standard quagmire is further complicated by its required
causation analysis:
As with other torts, informed consent law restricts recovery to harm
caused by the breach of duty, in this case, a duty to disclose material information relating to the risks involved with a medical procedure. The
harm is associated with the risk of an injury which occurred. To prove
causation, the plaintiff must therefore show two links in the causal
chain: first, that nondisclosure caused the patient to agree to a procedure
which otherwise she would have declined ("decision causation"); second, that the procedure actually caused the patient's harm ("injury causation"). The second link is difficult to make because even the nondisclosed alternatives are likely to carry some degree of risk. The first link
encumbers the court in a host of postfacto difficulties: given the fact of
actual injury, and assuming that the offered treatment was itself reasonable (since otherwise the doctor presumably would be liable for negligent care), it is virtually impossible to determine what a hypothetical,
"reasonable" patient would have done in similar circumstances.
Heinemann, supra note 4, at 1083-84.
Ketler, supra note 162, at 1038.
164.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1374. See also Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ill.
165.
Ct. App. 1980) (experts need to evaluate risks of treatment); Woolley v. Henderson, 418
A.2d 1123, 1131 (Me. 1980) (only physician can appreciate risks of disclosure); Bly v.
Rhodes, 222 S.E.2d 783, 787 (Va. 1976) (lay testimony should not substitute where medical
judgment involved); Smith v. Shannon, 666 P.2d 351, 356 (Wash. 1983) (lay people unable
to recognize risks associated with treatment).
166.
Canterbury,464 F.2d at 781.
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the risks associated with treatment is an antiquated notion. The days of
paternalistic medicine are long gone. Technology has changed all that.
Medical information is now widely accessible on-line, meaning that
patients are more medically sophisticated than ever before. In today's
environment, it is not uncommon for patients to show up at their physician's office armed with information about their particular medical
situation, including the latest treatment alternatives and available remedies
(some of which may not even be known to the treating physician). In short,
today's patients are "good enough" to make their own health care
decisions-for better or worse.
Fourth, some advocates for the professional standard argue that since
the physician's principle obligation during consultations with the patient is
to advance the patient's best interest, a physician should not be put in the
position of being second-guessed by what a jury in hindsight might deem
material at trial. 167 After all, why should a physician be blamed for failing
to disclose a particular risk when the patient failed to inquire about that
risk? Again, absent certain exceptions, 168 it is the patient's prerogative, not
the physician's, to determine where his or her interests lie. 169 Furthermore,
erring on the side of more disclosure makes it clear to the jury the extent to
which the physician has gone to convey the risks involved, which all but
eliminates any second-guessing.
Other factors relevant to this discussion relate to the uncertainty
within the medical profession itself. One unfortunate aspect of the
professional standard is that it gives virtually unlimited discretion to the
medical community to define the proper scope of disclosure. 7 ° This is
especially troubling given that the very existence of a generalized medical
custom regarding disclosure might not even exist. 171 As observed by Judge
Robinson, writing for the majority in Canterbury:

167.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1374 (citing Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (Me.
1980); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905 (Miss. 1970)). See also Bly, 222 S.E.2d at 787
(noting that lay testimony is inexact and unrealistic in evaluating medical judgment).
See supra notes 43-47.
168.
169.
Canterbury,464 F.2d at 781.
170.
See Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971) (holding that a
patient's right to know material information concerning a proposed treatment cannot be
dependent upon the self-imposed standards of the medical profession).
171.
See Festa, 511 A.2d at 1375 (noting that the "detractors of the reasonable
physician standard claim that a custom regarding disclosure of risks and alternatives is not
readily discernible in the medical community"). See also Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W.
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 636-37 (1970) (making
the same argument).
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There are, in our view, formidable obstacles to acceptance
of the notion that the physician's obligation to disclose is
either germinated or limited by medical practice. To begin
with, the reality of any discemable custom reflecting a professional consensus on communication of option and risk
information to patients is open to serious doubt. We sense
the danger that what in fact is no custom at all may be
taken as an affirmative custom to maintain silence, and that
physician-witnesses to the so-called custom may state
merely their personal opinions as
to what they or others
1 72
would do under given conditions.
This point relates to yet another fact, which is that the physician-based
standard imposes an insurmountable burden on plaintiffs faced with finding
physicians willing to breach
the "community of silence" inherent among
73
medical professionals. 1
Furthermore, insofar as physicians rely on non-medical factors (e.g., a
patient's emotional state) in obtaining informed consent, professional
custom regarding disclosure is irrelevant given that it would vary from
patient to patient. 74 Thus, a medical-based community standard is only
relevant when determining matters of a purely medical nature-for
example, in ordinary malpractice claims, which generally concern quality
of treatment issues. 175 Taken together, all of these factors cast serious
doubt on the justifications advanced by Colorado courts and others for the
continued application of the professional standard of disclosure. The
strongest consideration for change is that premise expressed in the pinnacle
case of Canterbury itself: A physician's duty of disclosure "arises from
phenomena apart from medical
custom and practice"-that is, patient's
76
right of self-determination. 1

172.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783-84.
173.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1375 (quoting Cooper, 286 A.2d 647). See generally Woods
v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (N.M. 1962), overruled, Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180
(N.M. 1978) (replacing the "full disclosure" standard with a "subjective standard").
174.
Festa, 511 A.2d at 1375.
175.
Id. (citing Defulvio v. Holst, 414 A.2d 1087 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979); Wilkinson v.
Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972)).
176.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The past 100 years have seen enormous expansion in the rights of
patients to participate more freely in the American health care setting. At
the turn of the 20th Century, paternalistic medicine gave way to the
recognition that treatment without consent gave rise to an action for assault
and battery. Courts then expanded upon this theory of self-determination
by providing a mechanism whereby patients were provided a remedy for
injuries resulting from undisclosed risks, even in the absence of negligence
on the part of the physician. In the process, two theories of disclosure
emerged, resulting in a division of authority in this country over the
adequacy of physician disclosure.
The Colorado Supreme Court first scrutinized the doctrine of informed consent and adopted the professional standard of disclosure over 30
years ago. At that time, the patient-based standard was still in its infancy,
having been adopted by only a handful of jurisdictions. Now, however,
nearly one-half of all jurisdictions follow the patient-oriented standard of
disclosure. Yet, Colorado courts continue to defend its application of the
professional standard on grounds that adopting the reasonable patient
approach is simply unworkable. However, the arguments noted above
illustrate that such excuses are no longer justified. Old habits are hard to
break. Established beliefs and doctrine are likely to become entrenched
and to be continued. However, changes in the law of informed consent can
and should be undertaken to ensure a patient's right of self-determination.
It follows that the better informed a patient is about the risks attendant a
particular medical procedure, the better he or she will be able to make an
informed health care decision. The professional standard simply does not
achieve this objective. Hopefully, it will not take another thirty years to
realize that change is necessary.

